Southampton Police

971 of the Unconsolidated Law

2012-01-27T08:41:00.000-08:00

OVERTIME?

§971 of the Unconsolidated Law, in relevant part, provides that police officers shall not be assigned to tours of duty exceeding eight consecutive hours of each consecutive 24 hours, with certain exceptions. See, also, Police Asso. of the City of Mt. Vernon v City of Mt. Vernon, 279 A.D.2d 561

POLICE ASSOCIATION OF CITY OF MOUNT VERNON v. CITY OF MOUNT VERNON
POLICE ASSOCIATION OF the CITY OF MOUNT VERNON, Respondent, v. CITY OF MOUNT VERNON, et al., Appellants.

-- January 22, 2001

DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., SONDRA MILLER, WILLIAM D. FRIEDMANN and NANCY E. SMITH, JJ.

Rains & Pogrebin, P.C., Mineola, N.Y. (Terence M. O'Neil, Ernest R. Stolzer, and Julie A. Torrey of counsel), for appellants.Bunyan & Baumgartner, LLP, Blauvelt, N.Y. (Joseph P. Baumgartner of counsel), for respondent.

In a purported proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 for a judgment declaring, inter alia, that the City of Mount Vernon and Gertrude LaForgia violated McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of N.Y. § 971(a) and enjoining them from committing such violations in the future, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Leavitt, J.), dated November 10, 1999, which, upon an order of the same court, entered October 22, 1999, granting the petition, declared that the City of Mount Vernon and Gertrude LaForgia violated McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of N.Y. § 971(a) by requiring police officers to work more than eight hours in a consecutive 24-hour period when no emergency existed, and enjoined them from any further violation of McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of N.Y. § 971(a). The appellants' notice of appeal from the order entered October 22, 1999, is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment (see, CPLR 5520[c]).

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, by adding thereto a provision converting the proceeding into an action for a declaratory judgment (see, CPLR 103[c]), with the notice of petition deemed a summons and the petition deemed a complaint; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, with costs to the petitioner.

The Supreme Court correctly determined that the appellants violated McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of N.Y. § 971(a) by requiring members of the City of Mount Vernon Police Department to work more than one eight-hour shift in a consecutive 24-hour period in the absence of an emergency situation within the meaning of the statute. Contrary to the appellants' contention, the petitioner did not waive its right to enforce the requirements of McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws § 971(a) in the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Further, the appellants could not unilaterally impose overtime in the absence of an emergency situation within the meaning of the statute (see, Spring Valley PBA v. Village of Spring Valley, 80 A.D.2d 910, 911, 437 N.Y.S.2d 400).

The appellants' contention that the disputed assignment of overtime was permissible because an emergency situation existed is improperly raised for the first time on appeal and, in any event, is without merit.

Is the photo real? I mean really????

2012-01-14T18:24:00.000-08:00

It has recently been brought to my attention that the authenticity of this photograph has been brought in question. Specifically, a third party states Kimberly McMachon now claims among other things that this photograph was created or edited with Adobe Photoshop. The original posting did have a 3^rd person “cropped” out of the photograph but it was not alerted, as Kimberly would intimate. Kim seems to want people to believe that it is not her head or body standing next to then Lt. William Wilson at the Suffolk County Police Seasonal Police Officer graduation. So now just ask everybody in the photo; was it really Kim standing next to her boyfriend now Chief William Wilson in this picture on that date and time? Uh yea!

Switching !!!!

2011-10-06T19:00:00.001-07:00

Transfer to a different retirement plan

Transfer to a different retirement plan
Overton v Southampton, 273 AD2d 242; Motion for leave to appeal denied, 95 NY2d 764

In the Overton case, the Appellate Division, Second Department, ruled that if a member of the State Employees’ Retirement System transfers from one plan to a different plan, he or she is subject to the relevant provisions of law concerning the plan into which he or she has transferred.

The Town of Southampton adopted a resolution on November 23, 1999. This resolution terminated the employment of its Chief of Police, James P. Overton, effective January 7, 1999, Overton’s 55th birthday. The Town’s action was based on the retirement plan to which Overton had previously transferred -- the Section 384-d plan.

According to the decision, although Overton was initially enrolled in a 25-year retirement plan with a mandatory retirement age of 70, he later elected to transfer into an optional 20-year retirement plan when the optional plan became available to the Town’s police officers pursuant to Section 384-d of the Retirement and Social Security Law.

Although Section 384-d requires members to retire no later than age 62, in 1971 a new subdivision, subdivision (m), was added to Section 384-d. Subdivision m applied only to Southampton law enforcement personnel and required police officers in the Section 384-d plan to retire at age 55.

Subdivision (m) provides that [n]otwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law, if the town board of the town of Southampton elects to make the benefits of this section available to the members of its police department, each member of such department shall be separated from service upon completion of twenty years of service, provided, however, that the town board may permit a member to continue in service on an annual basis after the completion of twenty years of service, but in no event shall such annual service be continued after a member has attained age fifty-five.

Approaching age 55, Overton decided he wanted to withdraw from the Section 384-d 20-year plan and transfer back into the 25-year plan so that he could continue his employment with the Town after reaching age 55. The Town, however, adopted a resolution separating him from service effective January 7, 2000, his 55th birthday.

Another factor in the litigation: The State Comptroller had issued an opinion indicating that Section 384-d(m) requires any Town police officer who ever enrolled in the 20-year plan to separate from service at age 55, regardless of whether the officer has subsequently withdrawn from the plan.*

Overton sued the Town and the Comptroller in an effort to annul the Town’s action and be approved for transfer into another plan. Unsuccessful in Supreme Court, he appealed. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s ruling, holding that the resolution in question adopted by the Town of Southampton on November 23, 1999, is annulled.

The rationale for the court’s annulling the Town’s resolution:

Section 384-d(b) of the Retirement and Social Security Law allows a member who elects to participate in a 20-year plan to withdraw from the plan and enroll in another retirement plan. According to the decision, the plain meaning of the statute, read as a whole, is that a Town police officer may withdraw from the 20-year plan and enroll in another available retirement plan.

The court rejected the Town’s arguments in support of its action, commenting that subdivision (m) does not require a member who changes plans to nevertheless retire at age 55.

The court said that nothing in the Retirement and Social Security Law suggests that Overton was required to retire at age 55 upon his transfer to another plan with a higher mandatory retirement age.

The bottom line: the court decided that Overton has the right to withdraw from the 20-year retirement plan and transfer to the 25-year retirement plan available to Town police officers with a mandatory retirement age of 70.

* The Comptroller was severed from the lawsuit, having earlier agreed that if the Town’s resolution is annulled, the Retirement System would not prevent Overton from continuing in service and obtaining credit for such service for “retirement allowance” purposes.

N.Y. RSS. LAW § 384-d : NY Code - Section 384-D: Optional twenty year retirement plan for certain firemen and policemen whose employer elects to provi

2011-10-01T20:19:00.000-07:00

SECTION "M" is what you need to refers to if you are wondering how the Town Board makes it's choices.

a. Any member of the retirement system who is a fireman, policeman  or   officer  of  any  organized fire department or organized police force or   police department of any county, city,  town,  village,  fire  district,   police district or participating employer may elect to contribute to the   retirement  system  pursuant  to  this  section within one year after he   becomes such an officer  or  member,  if  his  employer  has  previously   elected  to  make the benefits provided herein available to its officers   and members, or within one year after his employer elects  to  make  the   benefits provided herein available to its officers and members.     b.  Elections  made  pursuant  to this section shall be in writing and   shall be duly acknowledged and filed with the  comptroller.  Any  member   who  files  such  an  election  pursuant to this section may withdraw it   after it has been filed for at least a year. Such withdrawal shall be by   written notice duly acknowledged and filed with the  comptroller.  After   such withdrawal such member shall contribute to the retirement system as   otherwise provided in this article.     c.  A member who elects to contribute in accordance with this section,   shall contribute, in lieu of the proportion of compensation as  provided   in section three hundred twenty-one of this article, a proportion of his   compensation  similarly  determined.  Such  latter  proportion  shall be   computed to provide, at the time when he shall first become eligible for   retirement under this section, an annuity equal to one-eightieth of  his   final average salary for each year of service as a member rendered after   his  employer  elects  the  provisions of this section, and prior to the   attainment  of  the  age  when  he  shall  first  become  eligible   for   retirement.  Such member's rate of contribution pursuant to this section   shall  be  appropriately  reduced  pursuant  to  section  three  hundred   seventy-a  of  this  article  for  such  period  of time as his employer   contributes      pursuant       to       such       section       toward   pensions-providing-for-increased-take-home-pay  provided,  however, that   such member may by written notice duly acknowledged and filed  with  the   comptroller,  make  an  election  to waive such reduction as provided by   subdivision j of section three hundred twenty-one of this  article.  One   year  or  more  after the filing thereof, a member may withdraw any such   election  by  written  notice  duly  acknowledged  and  filed  with  the   comptroller.   Such   member's   rate  of  contribution  shall  also  be   appropriately reduced by any multiple of twenty-five per centum  of  the   additional  cost  which a member's employer has elected to contribute on   his behalf in lieu of  such  member's  contributions  pursuant  to  this   subdivision.     d.  No  such  member  shall  be  required  to make contributions after   completing twenty years of such service.     e. A member contributing on the basis of this section at the  time  of   retirement,  shall  be entitled to retire after the completion of twenty   years of total creditable service in  such  fire  department  or  police   force  or department, or upon the attainment of age sixty-two, by filing   an application therefor in a manner similar to that provided in  section   three hundred seventy of this article.     (1)  Upon  completion  of  twenty  years  of  such  service  and  upon   retirement, each such member shall receive  a  pension  which,  together   with  an annuity, if any, which shall be the actuarial equivalent of his   accumulated  contributions  at  the  time  of  his  retirement  and   an   additional   pension   which   is   the   actuarial  equivalent  of  the   reserve-for-increased-take-home-pay to which he may then be entitled, if   any, shall be sufficient to provide  him  with  a  retirement  allowance   equal to one-half of his final average salary.      (2)  Upon  attainment  of  age  sixty-two  and upon retirement without   completion of twenty years of  such  service,  each  such  member  shall   receive a pension which together with an annuity, if any, which shall be   the actuarial equivalent of his accumulated contributions at the time of   his  retirement  and  an  additional  pension  which  is  the  actuarial   equivalent of the reserve-for-increased-take-home-pay to  which  he  may   then  be  entitled,  if  any,  shall be sufficient to provide him with a   retirement allowance equal to one-fortieth of his final  average  salary   for  each  year  of creditable service in such fire department or police   force or department. Every such member shall  also  be  entitled  to  an   additional  pension  equal  to  the  pension  for any creditable service   rendered while not an employee of such fire department or  police  force   or department as provided under paragraphs three and four of subdivision   a  of  section  three  hundred seventy-five of this article. This latter   pension shall not increase the total allowance to more than one-half  of   his final average salary.     For the purpose only of determining the amount of the pension provided   in  this  subdivision e, the annuity shall be computed as it would be if   it were not reduced by the actuarial equivalent of any outstanding loan,   and if it  were  not  increased  by  the  actuarial  equivalent  of  any   additional  contributions,  and  if it were not reduced by reason of the   member's  election  to  decrease  his  annuity  contributions   to   the   retirement  system  in  order  to  apply the amount of such reduction in   payment  of  his  contributions  for  old-age  and  survivors  insurance   coverage.     f.  The  increased  pensions  to  such  members,  as  provided by this   section, shall  be  paid  from  additional  contributions  made  by  the   participating  employer  on  account of such members. The actuary of the   retirement system shall compute the additional contribution required for   each member who elects to receive the special  benefits  provided  under   this  section.  Such  additional  contributions shall be computed on the   basis of contributions during the prospective  service  of  such  member   which  will  cover the liability of the retirement system for such extra   pensions.     Upon  approval  of  the   comptroller,   such   additional   contributions  shall  be  certified  by him to the fiscal officer of the   participating employer.  The amount thereof shall  be  included  in  the   annual   appropriation  of  the  participating  employer  for  its  fire   department and police force or department. Such amount shall be paid  on   the  warrant  of the fiscal officer of the participating employer to the   pension accumulation fund of the retirement system.     g. In computing the twenty years of completed service of a member of a   police department or fire department, full credit  shall  be  given  for   military  service as defined in subdivisions twenty-nine-a and thirty of   section three hundred two of this  chapter.  In  addition,  full  credit   shall  be  given and full allowance shall be made for prior service in a   fire department or police force or department, other than the  force  or   department  in  which  he  is a member at the time of retirement, if his   employer elects to assume the cost of such prior fire or police  service   as hereinafter provided.     The  member's employer, however, by appropriate action, may (a) in its   initial action under this section, elect to assume all of the additional   cost on account  of  service  as  an  officer  or  member  of  any  such   department  or  force  rendered  to such employer prior to the effective   date of such election and (b) in any  subsequent  action,  as  hereafter   provided  in  this paragraph, elect to assume all of the additional cost   on account of previous service as an officer or member of any such other   department or force and, in addition may in  its  initial  action  under   this  section, elect to assume any multiple of twenty-five per centum of    such additional cost  on  account  of  such  service  for  such  current   employer  rendered  on  and  after  the  effective  date of such initial   election. Any subsequent election changing the percentage of  additional   cost  assumed  by  an  employer shall apply only to service rendered for   such employer on  and  after  the  effective  date  of  such  subsequent   election.  The  employer shall pay the additional cost so assumed by any   such election by means of annual contributions which shall be determined   by the actuary and paid by the  employer  in  the  same  manner  as  the   contributions  required under section three hundred twenty-three of this   article. An employer, which in its initial action elected to assume  all   of  the  additional  cost  on  account  of service only as an officer or   member of its police or fire department rendered prior to the  effective   date  of  such  election may elect to assume all of the additional cost,   including the cost of the necessary actuarial reevaluation on account of   previous service rendered as an officer or member of any such  organized   fire  department  or organized police force or department of any county,   city, town, village, fire district, police  district,  or  participating   employer other than such employer.     h.  Upon  retirement  of  any  member  pursuant  to  this section, any   additional amounts credited to  the  member's  annuity  savings  account   pursuant  to  subdivision  b  of  section  three  hundred thirty of this   article shall be treated as excess contributions and shall  be  used  to   provide  an  annuity  in  addition  to  the  annuity  prescribed by this   section. Any other amounts credited  to  the  member's  annuity  savings   account,  except  the  amounts contributed or required to be contributed   under this section and except such amounts as are  required  to  produce   the  retirement allowance provided by subdivision e of this section, may   at the option of the member at the time of retirement  be  withdrawn  or   used to provide an annuity in addition to the annuity prescribed by this   section.     i.  Every  member  contributing  on the basis of this section shall be   separated from the service on the last day of the  calendar  month  next   succeeding the calendar month in which he or she attains age sixty-five,   provided, however, that such a member who attained the age of sixty-five   before  his or her employer elected to make the benefits provided herein   available to him or her, or who attains the age of sixty-five within one   month after his or her employer makes such  benefits  available,  to  be   eligible  for  a  pension  computed in accordance with the provisions of   subdivision e of this section,  shall  be  separated  from  the  service   within  three  months  after  his  or  her  employer makes such benefits   available, or on  or  before  December  thirty-first,  nineteen  hundred   sixty-eight,  whichever  shall last occur, provided further, however, to   be eligible to remain on payroll under this section after attaining  the   age  of sixty-two, such members must be capable of performing the duties   of their position.     j. The provisions of this section shall be controlling notwithstanding   any provision in this article to the contrary.     k. The benefits of this section  shall  be  available  only  to  those   policemen  and firemen whose employer elects to provide such benefits by   adopting a resolution to such effect and filing a certified copy thereof   with the comptroller.     l. Except for members of the Westchester county department  of  public   safety  services who are required to contribute to the retirement system   in the manner provided by  section  three  hundred  eighty-six  of  this   article,  every member who enters or reenters service in the Westchester   county department of public safety services  on  or  after  July  first,   nineteen  hundred  seventy-nine, and who is engaged directly in criminal   law enforcement activities which aggregate fifty per centum or  more  of    said  member's service, shall contribute to the retirement system in the   manner provided for by this section.     m.  Notwithstanding  any  inconsistent  provision  of law, if the town   board of the town of Southampton elects to make  the  benefits  of  this   section  available  to the members of its police department, each member   of such department shall be separated from service  upon  completion  of   twenty  years  of  service,  provided,  however, that the town board may   permit a member to continue in service on  an  annual  basis  after  the   completion of twenty years of service, but in no event shall such annual   service  be continued after a member has attained age fifty-five, except   however, that members of such department who hold the rank  of  sergeant   or  higher  within such department may be permitted by the town board to   remain in service until the member has attained age sixty.     n. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law, if  the  village   board of the village of Westhampton Beach elects to make the benefits of   this  section  available  to  the members of its police department, each   member  of  each  department  shall  be  separated  from  service   upon   completion  of  twenty  years  of  service,  provided, however, that the   village board will permit a member to continue in service on  an  annual   basis  after  the completion of twenty years of service, but in no event   shall such optional service be continued after a member has attained age   fifty-five.     o. Any member of the policemen's and firemen's retirement  system  who   was  a  member  of the New York state employees' retirement system while   employed as a police department cadet and whose membership  therein  was   terminated  by his attaining membership in the policemen's and firemen's   retirement system, may purchase  credit  in  the  said  policemen's  and   firemen's retirement system for prior creditable service in the New York   state  employees'  retirement  system  earned while employed as a police   department cadet and shall have the period of such prior service  credit   counted  as  police service for the purpose of determining the amount of   his pension and retirement allowance and period of  service  needed  for   retirement.  In  order  to purchase credit pursuant to this subdivision,   the member shall pay into the pension accumulation fund the contribution   amount as determined by the comptroller, either in  a  lump  sum  or  in   installments,  necessary  to  pay  in  full  the  cost  of such previous   service. If such payment be made in installments, the same shall be paid   within a period no greater than the number  of  months  of  such  member   service granted.     p.  (1) Any member of the policemen's and firemen's retirement system,   who was a member of the New  York  state  employees'  retirement  system   while employed as a police department cadet and whose membership therein   was  terminated  by  his  attaining  membership  in  the policemen's and   firemen's retirement system, may purchase credit in the said policemen's   and firemen's retirement system for prior creditable service in the  New   York  state  employees'  retirement system earned as a police department   cadet and shall have the period of such prior service credit counted  as   police  service for the purpose of determining the amount of his pension   and retirement allowance and period of service needed for retirement. In   order to purchase credit pursuant to this  subdivision  a  member  shall   deposit  in  the pension accumulation fund a sum equal to the product of   the participating employers' normal contribution rate at the time of the   member's entry into such police department  cadet  service,  his  annual   rate  of  compensation at that time, and the period of police department   cadet service being claimed, with regular interest. Such deposit must be   made within one year of  the  date  of  election  by  the  participating   employer, provided however, such member may elect to deposit such amount   over  a  period  of  time no greater than the period for which credit is    being claimed, in which case such payments must commence within one year   of the date of election by  the  participating  employer.  If  the  full   amount of such payments is not paid to the retirement system, the amount   of  service  credited  shall  be proportional to the total amount of the   payments made.     (2) The  benefit  provided  for  in  paragraph  one  hereof  shall  be   conditioned upon the participating employer electing, within three years   of  the  effective date of this subdivision, in a manner similar to that   provided in subdivision a  of  section  three  hundred  thirty  of  this   article to provide this benefit and assuming the additional cost thereof   on  account  of  all of the officers and members of its organized police   force or department who are contributing under the  provisions  of  this   section.  The  benefit provided for in paragraph one of this subdivision   shall be paid from additional  contributions  made  by  the  appropriate   participating  employer  on  account of such members. The actuary of the   retirement system shall compute the additional  contributions  for  each   employer who elects to provide the benefits provided under paragraph one   of  this subdivision. Such additional contributions shall be computed on   the basis of  contributions  during  the  prospective  service  of  such   members which will cover the liability of the retirement system for such   extra  pensions.  Upon  approval  of  the  comptroller,  such additional   contributions shall be certified by him to the  fiscal  officer  of  the   participating employer.     q.  Notwithstanding  any  inconsistent provision of law, if any person   formerly employed as a paramedic by the town of  Tonawanda  between  the   period  of  October  seventeenth,  nineteen  hundred seventy-four to May   fourteenth, nineteen hundred eighty and who became employed by said town   as a police officer on May fifteenth, nineteen hundred  eighty  and  was   assigned  to  the  fifty-five  year  police  retirement  plan  due to no   negligence of his own, desires to join the twenty year  plan,  he  shall   have  six  months  after  the effective date of this subdivision to make   application for said transfer.     r. The benefits hereinabove provided shall be  payable  to  a  member,   unless  at  the  date  of  retirement,  such  member  would otherwise be   entitled to a greater benefit under other provisions of this article had   he withdrawn from this section, in which  event  such  greater  benefits   shall be payable.     s.  1.  Any  member  of  the city of Yonkers police department or fire   department who was  previously  enrolled  in  an  optional  twenty  year   retirement  plan  pursuant  to this section and whose enrollment in such   plan ceased upon transfer to the retirement  plan  created  pursuant  to   section  three  hundred  eighty-eight  of  this  article,  may  elect to   re-enroll in the twenty year retirement plan pursuant to this section if   the city council of the city of Yonkers elects  to  make  such  benefits   available.     2. The benefits provided by paragraph one of this subdivision shall be   conditioned  upon the participating employer electing within three years   of the effective date of this subdivision, in a manner  similar  to  the   election  stipulated in subdivision b of section three hundred thirty of   this article, to provide such benefits and to assume the additional cost   of such benefits for all officers and members of  its  organized  police   department   and  fire  department  who  otherwise  transferred  to  the   retirement plan provided by section three hundred eighty-eight  of  this   article.     t.  Any  member  of  the  New  York  state  and  local police and fire   retirement system who was a member  of  the  New  York  city  employees'   retirement  system  while  employed as a New York city police department   trainee or a New York city transit officer trainee and whose  membership    therein was terminated by his attaining membership in the New York state   and  local police and fire retirement system, may purchase credit in the   New York state and local police and fire  retirement  system  for  prior   creditable  service  in  the  New York city employees' retirement system   earned while employed as a police department trainee or transit  officer   trainee  and  shall have the period of such prior service credit counted   as police service for the purpose  of  determining  the  amount  of  his   pension  and  retirement  allowance  and  period  of  service needed for   retirement. In order to purchase credit pursuant  to  this  subdivision,   the member shall pay into the pension accumulation fund the contribution   amount  as  determined  by  the  comptroller, either in a lump sum or in   installments, necessary to  pay  in  full  the  cost  of  such  previous   service. If such payment be made in installments, the same shall be paid   within  a  period  no  greater  than the number of months of such member   service granted.     * u. (1) Any member of the Nassau  county  police  department  who  is   enrolled  in  section  three  hundred eighty-five-a of this article, may   elect to enroll in the twenty year  retirement  plan  pursuant  to  this   section if Nassau county elects to make such benefits available.     (2)  The  benefits provided by paragraph one of this subdivision shall   be conditioned upon the participating  employer  electing  within  three   years  of the effective date of this subdivision, in a manner similar to   the election stipulated in subdivision b of section three hundred thirty   of this article, to provide such benefits and to assume  the  additional   cost  of  such  benefits  for  all officers and members of its organized   police department who otherwise would be covered by the retirement  plan   provided by section three hundred eighty-five-a of this article.     * NB There are 2 sub u's     * u.  1.  Any  member  of  the Suffolk county police department who is   enrolled in the  retirement  plan  provided  by  section  three  hundred   eighty-seven-a  of  this article, may elect to enroll in the twenty year   retirement plan pursuant to this section if  Suffolk  county  elects  to   make such benefits available.     2. The benefits provided by paragraph one of this subdivision shall be   conditioned  upon the participating employer electing within three years   of the effective date of this subdivision, in a manner  similar  to  the   election  stipulated in subdivision b of section three hundred thirty of   this article, to provide such benefits and to assume the additional cost   of such benefits for all officers and members of  its  organized  police   department  who  otherwise  would  be  covered  by  the  retirement plan   provided by section three hundred eighty-seven-a of this article.     * NB There are 2 sub u's     v. (1)  Notwithstanding  any  inconsistent  provision  of  law,  those   individuals  employed  as  police  officers  by the village of Freeport,   specifically Kevin Case, Shawn Randall, Andrew Rhan, Scott  Ballard  and   Michael  Horne,  and  who  are enrolled in an improved career retirement   plan authorized pursuant to section three hundred seventy-five-i of this   article, who for reasons not ascribable to their own  negligence  failed   to  previously  join  the  twenty  year retirement plan pursuant to this   section may elect to enroll in such plan  if  the  village  of  Freeport   elects to make such benefits available.     (2)  The  benefits provided by paragraph one of this subdivision shall   be conditioned upon the participating  employer  electing  within  three   years  of the effective date of this subdivision, in a manner similar to   the election stipulated in subdivision b of section three hundred thirty   of this article, to provide such benefits.     (3) The employer shall have the option of amortizing the cost of  this   measure over a period of five years.      w.  Notwithstanding  any  other  provision of law to the contrary, any   member of the New York state and local police and fire retirement system   who was a member of the New York state and local  employees'  retirement   system  while employed as an investigator-trainee, Waterfront Commission   of  New  York  Harbor,  which is not deemed to be police service, who is   employed by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor,  which  is  an   employer  electing to participate in the optional twenty year retirement   plan pursuant to this section shall be deemed to  have  provided  police   service  while  so  employed  by  the  Waterfront Commission of New York   Harbor and shall receive creditable service in the New  York  state  and   local  police and fire retirement system for prior creditable service in   the New York state and local employees' retirement system  earned  while   employed  as  an  investigator-trainee and shall have the period of such   prior service credit counted  as  police  service  for  the  purpose  of   determining  the  amount  of  their pension and retirement allowance and   period of service needed for retirement.     x. Notwithstanding any  provision  of  this  section,  service  as  an   aircraft   rescue   firefighter   employed   by   the  Niagara  frontier   transportation authority shall be included for the purposes of computing   police or fire service for retirement pursuant to this section, provided   such authority has elected to participate in  the  New  York  state  and   local  police  and  fire  retirement  system  and  elects to provide the   benefit of this section.     y. Any member currently enrolled pursuant  to  this  section  and  who   previously  transferred service credit from the New York state and local   employees' retirement system to the New York state and local police  and   fire   retirement   system,   may  elect  to  transfer  such  previously   transferred service  credit  back  to  the  New  York  state  and  local   employees'  retirement  system, and such member shall have the option to   retroactively transfer  his  or  her  membership  into  such  employees'   retirement system.

2.6 Million? This is the back pay the members of the Southampton Village PBA will be paid during the next pay period

2011-07-10T21:27:00.000-07:00

Some of you in the PBA may wonder why the "Village" or "Mark" would not agree to the 1/60th Bill. There are two reasons why! First the 1/60th Bill is a non-mandatory subject of the collective bargaining process and can not be part of an interest arbitration award. This means in part that you (the PBA) can ask for at, the Village can give it BUT you can not force it thru the interest arbitration process. PERB has ruled it's a non-mandatory subject. The second reason the Village won't agree to the 1/60th Bill for retirees is the initial cost to the Village to get into the program. It would cost approximately 2.6 Million to get the PBA membership into 1/60th and an additional $29,000.00 per year. So when the contract expires in 2012 have a plan to make up the 2.6 Million if you still envision getting (asking) for the 1/60th.

Retro pay 6/1/10 to 5/31/11 6/1/11 to 5/31/12

Bobinski $3533.40 $321.21

Cornell $4504.61 $321.96

Cummings $5770.81 $520.41

Dorchak $4262.91 $398.59

Dunkirk $2914.66 $293.40

Gagnon $4572.40 $-3086.47

Gallo $3341.69 $-2687.50

Horstman $2616.38 $315.84

Hunsucker $2949.36 $243.74

Hurteau $4874.54 $429.17

Jones $2732.18 $191.95

Kellis $3882.47 $207.12

Lamison $4779.16 $444.14

Lubold $276.33 $151.88

McCully $2211.51 $276.20

McMahon $3506.20 $370.95

Medio $4827.29 $362.54

Mohl $4288.88 $357.39

Moore $2724.92 $273.08

Proctor $2200.81 $195.07

Pulliam $2030.50 $212.24

Raffel $4166.82 $370.52

Rios $2827.79 $276.51

Rodecker $3991.14 $316.86

Ronan $4501.00 $256.66

Ryan $4984.15 $416.36

Sinclair $2289.30 $264.05

Smith $3632.28 $-2668.61

Wetter $4128.76 $341.67

Zukosky $2241.84 $236.59

Fromm $2634.12

Lewis $11916.88

PBA & Village Contract is Signed by both parties

2011-06-23T10:29:00.000-07:00

If you would like to see the MOA that was signed by Mayor Mark Epley and Dave Dorchak here is a copy for all of you.

http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/58565944?access_key=key-17ly8w6e52hnre6ezoeu

Houses owned in Southampton by Detective Sergeant Lamison of the Southampton Village Police

2011-03-10T13:14:00.000-08:00

1. 77 Hillcrest Terrace SH
2. 11 Hillcrest Ave SH
3. 16 Windward Way SH
4. 124 Hillcrest Ave. SH
5. 82 Miller Road SH
6. 128 Hillcrest Ave SH
7. 44 Hillcrest Ave SH
8. 159 Hillcrest Ave SH
9. 123 Hillcrest Ave SH
10. 73 Hillcrest Ave SH
11. 171 Pulaski Street SH
12. 106 Powell Ave SH
13. 166 Powell Ave SH
14. 674 Bridgehampton Sag Harbor Turnpike SH
15. 32 Mill Farm Lane SH
16. 92 Glider Ave. Flanders
17. 159 Hillcrest Ave Tuckahoe
18. 325 Brookhaven Ave Flanders Ave
19. 40 Parrish Pond Lane Shinnecock Hills

2010 Southampton Village Payroll

2011-03-09T06:36:00.000-08:00

WholeName	TotalCompensation
Aldrich, Gary E	68946.6
Amerson, Kerrie J	80854.78
Banks Jr, William R	52570.15
Bennett, Kenneth E	57367.48
Bernhardt, Marjorie A	63110.79
Bertrand, Lisa M	67793.52
Bezubek, Barry J	47957.86
Blydenburgh, Kenneth W	54950.38
Bobinski, Bernard J	121719.95
Booth, Kenneth A	51329.45
Brostowski, John J	90963.74
Brown Jr, Frank A	45291.59
Brumsey, Vincent W	46780.79
Burns, Danielle M	66560.32
Cannon, Bonnie M	14999.92
Carey, Nicholas E	15048
Carmichael, Robert S	7696.5
Cause, John C	88813.83
Chuppe, Dennis J	45035.43
Cornell, Gregory D	156902.73
Costa, Sandra E	45920.7
Cummings, Thomas M	181692.46
Depetris, Richard E	69170.77
Dhew Jr, John E	69820.5
Dorchak, David P	145969.57
Downing, John B	45728.31
Dunkirk, Kevin A	91376.67
Dunkirk, Michael J	45542.48
Dunwell Jr, Le Roy R	60818.57
Edwards, Lennox T	47317.94
Fernan, Richard S	32208.5
Foster, Jonathan B	109282.31
Fromm, Erik L	141730.93
Funsch, Stephen E	110358.46
Gagnon, Darren R	144470.33
Gallo, Anthony P	121255.19
Goleski, Gary J	95729.94
Goleski, Robert D	57311.73
Grant, Stephen	43970.76
Greene, William P	57034.08
Gregor, Diane	43867.82
Guessferd, Linda S	53909.75
Hand, Robert F	47258.09
Hedges, Timothy J	43191.89
Hertling, Amy L	88573.19
Horstman, Michael C	79171.24
Hunsucker, Michael J	82644.64
Hurteau, Suzanne M	152812.83
Jones, Ashley E	72550.74
Kandula, John S	50605.25
Keghlian, Gregg	21700.01
Kellis, Stephen B	125441.46
Kopas, Edward J	50628.58
La Monica, Brian E	100447.3
Lamison Jr, Herman L	170312.84
Lamison, Youlanda E	43461.43
Ledermann, Patricia J	61468.97
Ledogar, James E	1008
Lesta, Charles K	60663.86
Lewis, Howard B	153413.41
Lloyd, Nicholas J	14144
Lonnie, Kirsten C	58463.43
Maddock, Mark M	62297.92
Mc Crave, Peter D	65700.23
Mc Laughlin, Kathy A	1344
Mc Loughlin, Leith M	47031.37
Mc Mahan, Robert S	15390
Mc Mahon, Kimberleigh A	101502.27
Mc Namara, Dean P	61641.83
Medio, Michael G	136817.23
Michel-Guerra, Mylene	49147.37
Michels, Helmut A	55389.66
Mohl, Christopher J	149979.34
Moore, James J	71901.07
Moran, Steven J	37399.36
Musarra, Eileen L	64599.03
Nanos, James C	43867.82
O'Donnell, Shannon L	43230.03
Oliver, Tara L	49879.91
Ottati, Patrick S	91754.22
Perez, Angel E	46963.04
Petry, Wayne	115053.07
Phillips Jr, Stephen F	50998.89
Pinckney, Brenda L	49526.39
Poremba, Donald	47173.17
Poremba, Katherine E	11820
Proctor, Kareem A	64745.58
Puleo, Thomas A	45009.33
Pulliam, Lee M	50384.22
Raffel, Theodore	146310.81
Rewinski, Thomas M	90906.62
Rios, Steven M	84802.22
Rizzo, Grace C	11880
Rodecker, John C	107253.65
Ronan, George T	144125.32
Ryan, Michael G	159577.5
Schmidt, David J	2240
Schucht, Arthur J	151309.03
Seymore Jr, George W	56979.4
Sikorski, Laura	51826.22
Simmons, Brenda	58977.19
Sinclair-Crotti, Michael M	67151.08
Smith, Bradden	123323.83
Smith, Joseph R	35588.44
So, Tien H	58077.83
Steward Jr, Michael A	44255.15
Steward Sr, Michael A	49253.74
Swenson, Thomas E	45035.43
Swezey, Corey C	51194.17
Talbot, Christopher M	75219.03
West, Edward J	42388.64
Wetter, Christopher T	125018.15
Wilson Jr, William E	187166.56
Wilson, Barbara L	41999.88
Wojcik, Larry H	79855.06
Wojcik, Rosalie J	11580
Wright, Bruce D	43908.92
Wright, Maryann S	54086.8
Zeh, Kenneth W	82466.66
Zukosky, Matthew B	14460
Zukosky, Steven E	33780.02

Where is the Detective Sergeant on the Lieutenants List? Parking Cars? Playing Basketball? Working Security?

2011-03-04T08:32:00.000-08:00

Eligible List Number: 10-5008-449
ExamTitle: LIEUTENANT (POLICE: TOWNS & VILLAGES) - PR
Established Date: 03/02/2011

Accurate as of date established. Only passing grades are displayed.

Position Number	Name	Score
1	BURTON, BRYAN O	97.40
2	D'AMICO, DENNIS	95
3	KIERNAN, JAMES J	90.50
4	RAFFEL, THEODORE	90
5	FROST, EDWARD J	89.20
6	DIFONZO, RENALD R	89
6	PALMER, STEPHEN T	89
8	BENNETT, TODD D	88
8	BROICH, CHRISTOPHER A	88
8	GINAS, JAMES A	88
11	RICCA, WILLIAM L	87.90
12	SCHNEIDER, JOHN P	86
13	PERKINS, RICHARD	85
14	SINNING, JOHN D	84
14	ZARRO, MICHAEL J	84
16	COSTA, LISA A	83
16	VAIL, JOHN H	83
18	JOYCE, MICHAEL P	82
19	FICURILLI, ANDREW J	81.10
20	SCOTT, BRIAN E	81
21	MOHL, CHRISTOPHER J	80.50
22	ATKINSON, RONALD J	80
23	MCGUIRE, AUSTIN J	79.60
24	BODEN, JOHN A	78
24	COOK, MICHAEL T	78
24	FUSCO, NICHOLAS A	78
24	MCMUNN, JASON E	78
28	SCOTT, LEWIS B	77.10
29	GURNEY, ROBERT S	76.60
30	FABIANO, PAUL E	76
31	DORCHAK, DAVID P	75.30
32	PAGANO, THOMAS J	75
33	FOSTER, SCOTT A	74
33	SANTACROCE, HENRY F	74
33	SLACK, GLENN C	74
36	SCHMITT, PETER J	72.80
37	SELTENREICH, EDWARD A	72.70

Another Bill for Ted Raffel

2011-02-27T18:20:00.000-08:00

S03462 Summary:

BILL NO    S03462   SAME AS    Same as Uni. A 5517  SPONSOR    LAVALLE  COSPNSR      MLTSPNSR       Provides for an increased death benefit payment by the New York state and local police and fire retirement system to the survivors of police officer Theodore Raffel, who was a Southampton Village police officer for 19 years, 364 days and 15 1/2 hours at the time of his death.

ART Heist(s) in Southampton Village - $5000.00 REWARD

2011-02-21T15:30:00.000-08:00

REWARD $5000.00

The Southampton Patch is reporting another theft of Artwork in Southampton Village. To follow the story click here: http://southampton.patch.com/articles/police-art-theft-discovered-at-another-southampton-village-estate

The first Art Heist in Southampton Village was reported in the New York Post and also covered by Southampton Patch. Click here to follow the story: Southampton Patch: http://southampton.patch.com/articles/villlage-police-enlist-suffolk-county-crime-stoppers-to-solve-250000-art-theft

New York Post Article(s): http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/widow_fine_art_filched_QAr2QW0O5gTYdzp9i7krjI

http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/art_heist_suspects_YSgBbmqtIiTU712m1CPihK

Now if you want to provide information that gets you possibly $5000.00 then go to the Suffolk County Police Crime Stoppers Web page here http://www.co.suffolk.ny.us/police/crimealerts.htm

New York Post Article for February 23rd 2011

http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/hamptons_art_of_steal_d8ylGIjOgUF6vCdqymxwIL

Now the burning question that nobody wants to ask; can you coach high school basketball, run a security business in Sagaponac, run a valet parking business AND find stolen art work at the same time? This story ran the same week the are work was reported stolen.

http://southampton.patch.com/articles/southampton-boys-face-babylon-in-playoffs-following-close-loss-wednesday#photo-4031216

Dispatch Magazine On-Line

2011-02-16T17:46:00.000-08:00

Dispatcher Resigns When Porn Inquiry Begins

July 10, 2010 at 1:51 pm

Officials in the Village of Southampton (NY) have issued a new regulation that sets out appropriate use of police computers after a reporter’s tip led to the discovery of pornographic photos and chat session logs. Police chief William Wilson Jr. began an investigation immediately after receiving the tip last April, and the next day an unnamed dispatcher resigned citing personal reasons. The next week, a sergeant filed papers for retirement. Wilson said investigators later found a sexually explicit video and several photos on a computer used exclusively by one employee, and similar e-mail messages and chat logs on two shared computers. The dispatcher reportedly was a three-year employee, with six years at another police department. Wilson would not name either departing employee, but the 27East Web site did name the female dispatcher, who told a reporter that her departure was related to child care. Both employees worked the 10 p.m. to 8 a.m. shift. Wilson said the new policy sets out the department’s right to review all data on its computers, and that accessing or sending sexually explicit materials, or downloading/importing files is prohibited. Read more about the incident here (read the comments) and about the employees here.

http://www.911dispatch.com/2010/07/dispatcher-resigns-when-porn-inquiry-begins/comment-page-1/#comment-6599

POLICE TEST COMING SOON!!!

2011-02-11T09:20:00.000-08:00

Want to be a Police Officer or Corrections Officer? Follow this link and apply on line for both. Take all 3 exams. Even if you don't speak spanish fluently.

Now if you want to be a Village or Town Police Officer you must establish residency in that jurisdiction within 90 days prior to your appointment.

https://www.co.suffolk.ny.us/civilservice/Exams/CSCart/WebForm1.aspx

NEW BILL

2011-02-08T12:42:00.000-08:00

A4737-2011: Allows the Village of Southampton to reopen the optional retirement plan offered under section 384-d of the retirement and social security law to police officer Theodore Raffel, Jr.

Same as: S3034 / Versions: A4737-2011

Allows the Village of Southampton to reopen the optional retirement plan offered under section 384-d of the retirement and social security law to police officer Theodore Raffel, Jr. Allows the Village of Southampton to reopen the optional retirement plan offered under section 384-d of the retirement and social security law to police officer Theodore Raffel, Jr.

Sponsor: / Law Section: Retirement

A4737-2011 Actions

Feb 7, 2011: REFERRED TO GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES

Christopher Broich Appeals Summary Judgement

2011-02-04T14:38:00.000-08:00

PRESS COVERAGE

Southampton Patch has the story here:

http://southampton.patch.com/articles/former-cop-appeals-dismissal-of-5-million-lawsuit-against-southampton-village

Some of you might ask the question “why spend the time money and effort” appealing the decision from Federal Judge Sandra J. Feuerstein? Simply put Judge Feuerstein granted summary judgment to the Village of Southampton and named Defendant(s) for matters not requested by the Village Attorney? The appeal could not be a more simple. You can’t lawfully grant summary judgment for something not requested in the motion for summary judgment in the first place. To be continued...........

Does a Union have a responsibility to employees outside the CBA? Does a Union have a duty to process a grievance of a former employee? YES!

2011-02-01T09:00:00.000-08:00

decided: October 13, 1987.

LINDA BAKER, APPELLANT,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE WEST IRONDEQUOIT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT ET AL., DEFENDANTS, AND THOMAS NICHOLS, AS PRESIDENT OF THE WEST IRONDEQUOIT TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, ET AL., RESPONDENTS

Appeal, by permission of the Court of Appeals, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, entered September 26, 1986, which (1) reversed, on the law, an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Wilmer J. Patlow, J.), entered in Monroe County, to the extent that it denied a motion by defendant West Irondequoit Teachers Association to dismiss the complaint as against it, and (2) granted the motion to dismiss.

Counsel

Thomas G. Dignan and Margaret A. Clemens for appellant.

Bernard F. Ashe, Ivor R. Moskowitz and Rocco A. Solimando for respondents.

Kaye, J. Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Alexander, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur.

Author: Kaye

Opinion OF THE COURT

This appeal calls upon us to determine first, what Statute of Limitations should govern an action by a teacher against a public sector union for breach of its duty of fair representation and second, whether a cause of action can be stated for breach of such duty by a teacher after resigning her position. We conclude that the action was timely because brought within six years of accrual, and that where constructivedischarge is the gravamen of the complaint resignation does not divest a teacher of a cause of action against the union.

For approximately 14 years plaintiff was a mathematics teacher in the West Irondequoit Central School District (the district) and a member of the West Irondequoit Teachers Association (the union). According to her complaint, during the 1983-1984 school year, plaintiff had been allowed a full-time education leave to pursue graduate studies in computer science, which the district planned to have her teach. In March 1984, she requested an extension to continue the two-year Masters' degree program, and was refused by the district superintendent. As an alternative, plaintiff in August requested relief from certain administrative duties so that she might continue her studies part time. After the superintendent replied that such relief might be arranged for one semester only, plaintiff resigned. Weeks later, she learned facts indicating that her requests may have been inequitably denied, including the fact that male teachers in similar circumstances had been granted leaves of absence and relief from administrative duties.

The collective bargaining agreement between the union and the district included a mandatory three-stage grievance procedure. Efforts were first to be made to resolve any grievance informally with the principal; next, a unit member was to submit the matter to the union's grievance committee. If the committee found the grievance legitimate, it would file a written appeal with the district superintendent, who would conduct a hearing and issue a written decision. Finally, if the member and union were dissatisfied, and if the union determined the grievance to be meritorious, it could submit the matter to arbitration.

Plaintiff alleges that on October 5, 1984, she delivered a letter to the school, with a copy to the union, outlining her grievance under the collective bargaining agreement. Five days later, the union notified her that it would not represent her and that she would have to pursue the matter on her own. One reason advanced was that, since plaintiff had already resigned, the union could not represent her in any grievance matters. Plaintiff's grievance was subsequently denied by the principal. Thereafter, the district superintendent denied a request that her resignation be set aside and that she be granted an extension of her education leave. The superintendent stated that he met with plaintiff as a courtesy but that the formal grievance procedure provided for in the collective bargaining agreement was not available to her because she was no longer an employee. Plaintiff's subsequent request for arbitration was denied by the district, which asserted that she could not use the grievance procedure without the union. Plaintiff then asked that the union reconsider submitting her grievance to arbitration; in February 1985 the union refused.

In July 1985, some 10 months after her resignation, plaintiff commenced the present action for reinstatement and other relief, alleging that the district had treated her inequitably based on her gender, in violation of the collective bargaining agreement as well as State and Federal laws, and that she had in effect been forced to resign, or had been constructively discharged. That matter is not now before us. She also asserted a cause of action against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation, claiming that the union's refusal to pursue the grievance on her behalf was arbitrary, capricious and in bad faith as it had not investigated her claims, had not contacted any witness concerning the circumstances of her case, and had never even contacted her for any information. The complaint further charged that the union's refusal to reconsider its decision was similarly arbitrary, capricious and in bad faith because the union had failed to consult her or her attorney and did not consult its own attorney regarding the merits of her grievance and her right to union representation. That is the matter now before us.

The union sought dismissal of the fair representation cause of action on three grounds: first, that it was untimely, having been commenced more than six months after accrual; second, that the complaint did not state a cause of action in that, upon her resignation, plaintiff ceased to be a member of the bargaining unit entitled to representation; and third, that plaintiff failed to exhaust contractual and internal union remedies. Special Term denied the motion but the Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the applicable limitations period for a cause of action for breach of a duty of fair representation by a public sector union is the Federal six-month period for filing an unfair labor practice against a private employer (DelCostello v Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151), and that any duty to represent plaintiff ceased when she resigned (123 A.D.2d 500). The court did not address the alleged failure to exhaust remedies. We now reverse and deny the union's motion to dismiss the complaint as against it.

Statute of Limitations

The rights and obligations of public sector employees and unions are governed by article 14 of the Civil Service Law, known as the Taylor Law (Civil Service Law ? 200 et seq.). Neither the Taylor Law nor the CPLR prescribes a Statute of Limitations applicable to actions for a union's breach of duty of fair representation. This appeal requires us to identify the period.

In DelCostello, the Supreme Court held that the six-month Statute of Limitations for bringing unfair labor practice charges before the National Labor Relations Board, contained in section 10 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act (the NLRA) (29 USC ? 160 [b]), governs suits by private employees against unions for breach of the duty of fair representation and against private employers for breach of collective bargaining agreements. The union argues that DelCostello compels us to apply the same limitations period to fair representation actions by public employees. In the alternative, the union urges that we apply the 90-day period provided in CPLR 7511 (a) for proceedings to vacate arbitration awards or the four-month limitations period established by the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) for bringing unfair labor practice charges before PERB (see, Civil Service Law ? 205 [5] [d]; ? 209-a; 4 NYCRR 204.1 [a] [1]).

We conclude that the Federal statute applied in DelCostello cannot govern this action under State law, and that -- until the Legislature acts to impose a limitations period -- the six-year statute (CPLR 213 [1]) must be applied.

The duty of fair representation may be traced to Federal law, where it arose as an implied cause of action under the scheme of the NLRA (DelCostello v Teamsters, 462 U.S., at 164, supra; Matter of Civil Serv. Bar Assn. v City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 188, 195-196). In determining the Statute of Limitations for such claims, the Supreme Court faced a familiar problem in Federal civil law: the law provided no Statute of Limitations for this cause of action, so the court had to borrow one elsewhere. While the court might ordinarily have selected the most closely analogous Statute of Limitations under State law, in DelCostello it determined that available State provisions were unsatisfactory and that implementation of Federal policy required application of a rule drawn from Federal law (462 U.S., at 166-169, supra). The court chose the limitations period set forth in the NLRA for making unfair practice charges to the National Labor Relations Board, reasoning that it had been designed with an eye to balancing the same Federal interests that were at issue in fair representation cases (462 U.S., at 169, supra).

Our determination must have a different focus because the fair representation cause of action against public sector unions has a different source. The State and its political subdivisions are explicitly excluded from the definition of employer contained in the NLRA (29 USC ? 152 [2]); that statute does not govern public sector unions or their members. Instead, the relationship among public employers, public employees and public employee organizations in New York State is governed by New York State's Taylor Law. In applying the section of the statute regarding improper employer and union practices, the Taylor Law provides that the "fundamental distinctions between private and public employment shall be recognized, and no body of federal or state law applicable wholly or in part to private employment, shall be regarded as binding or controlling precedent." (Civil Service Law ? 209-a [3]; see also, Matter of West Irondequoit Teachers Assn. v Helsby,35 N.Y.2d 46, 50.) The Taylor Law establishes the scheme by which certified unions are recognized as the exclusive bargaining agents for their members (Civil Service Law ? 204). This statutory role is the basis for the implied cause of action in favor of public employees against their unions for breach of the duty to represent all members fairly (Matter of Civil Serv. Bar Assn. v City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 188, 196, supra).

When DelCostello is applied to actions by private employees against their employers or unions for violations of obligations established under the NLRA, this is a simple matter of applying Federal limitations periods to Federal causes of action. But in article 2 of the CPLR the State Legislature has established time limitations for causes of action arising under State law, including even a catch-all provision to be applied when no other period has been specifically prescribed by law (CPLR 213 [1]). "The Statute of Limitations has been changed from time to time in New York in response to current needs and expectations in society and has been peculiarly a subject of legislative solicitude." (Cubito v Kreisberg, 69 A.D.2d 738, 746, affd for reasons stated in opn of Hopkins, J., 51 N.Y.2d 900; see also, 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac para. 201.01 ["Statutes of limitation are essentially creatures of the legislative rather than of the judicial process."].) We therefore must look to the limitations periods prescribed by the Legislature and select the one that best fits the character of an action for breach of the duty of fair representation under State law.

The options proposed by the union -- the 90-day limit for a proceeding to vacate an arbitration award (CPLR 7511 [a]) and the four-month period established by PERB for filing unfair practices claims (4 NYCRR 204.1 [a] [1]) -- are not suitable. In an action to vacate an arbitration award, the grievance has already "run its full course, culminating in a formal award by a neutral arbitrator" (DelCostello v Teamsters, 462 U.S., at 166, n 16, supra) ; this is scarcely parallel to an action for arbitrary refusal to take a grievance to arbitration in the first instance, where it is necessary to make investigation, evaluate responses, retain counsel and frame a complaint (id.). Unlike the statutory six-month period chosen by the Supreme Court in DelCostello, the four-month period found in the PERB regulation is of course not a period that has been fixed by the State Legislature for the preclusion of court actions. When a four-month limitation has been prescribed by statute for particular proceedings -- as in CPLR 217 -- it has been upon the Legislature's determination that there are strong policy considerations supporting such a truncated period, vital for the conduct of certain kinds of governmental affairs (Solnick v Whalen, 49 N.Y.2d 224, 232).

Plaintiff urges that the closest analogy to an action for breach of the duty of fair representation is a claim for legal malpractice, since both challenge the adequacy of representation in circumstances requiring specialized knowledge and advocacy skills. Based on Video Corp. v Flatto Assocs. (58 N.Y.2d 1026) and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assocs. (43 N.Y.2d 389), plaintiff would then have us apply the six-year Statute of Limitations for contract actions (CPLR 213 [2]), instead of the three-year statute for malpractice actions (CPLR 214 [6]), reasoning that ultimately the rights and obligations as established by the collective bargaining agreement between the union (as exclusive representative of the employees) and the district are at the root of the issues raised against the union in this action. In our view, this analogy also is flawed (see, United Parcel Serv. v Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56; see also, DelCostello v Teamsters, 462 U.S., at 165, supra), but we are nonetheless led to the result urged by plaintiff -- a six-year limitations period -- because this is the period the Legislature has prescribed for "an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law". (CPLR 213 [1].)

We recognize that application of the six-year period results in great disparity between similar claims of public and private employees, and also that it runs counter to other policy considerations. It is obviously desirable that labor disputes be resolved expeditiously. As has been noted in the private union context, the grievance and arbitration procedure often involves interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and fundamentally affects the relationship between the employer and the union; the system can become unworkable if these interpretations may be called into question years later (see, DelCostello v Teamsters, 462 U.S., at 169, supra; United Parcel Serv. v Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 63-64, supra). Whether or not identical considerations prevail in a member's fair representation claims against a public sector union, there is surely an equivalent interest in the prompt disposition of grievances. In deciding the case before us, we invite the Legislature to address the issue and fix a more suitable Statute of Limitations -- one that balances the private interest of employees in prosecuting their grievances and the public interest in the expeditious resolution of public sector labor disputes.^*fn1

Duty of Fair Representation

While various contentions are advanced regarding the scope of the duty of fair representation, only a narrow facet of this issue is before us. In its dismissal motion the union did not challenge the complaint on the basis that the conduct alleged fails to state a cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation, and we do not reach that issue.^*fn2 The union by its motion contested only its continuing duty to represent plaintiff after her resignation. As the court below concluded: "there is no duty to represent someone who is not a member of a union * * * Since plaintiff ceased to be a regular employee when she resigned effective September 4, 1984, the Union had no duty to represent her with respect to her grievance filed a month after her resignation. (see, Smith v Sipe, 67 N.Y.2d 928)." (123 A.D.2d 500,501-502, supra.) We disagree.

Initially, it is plain both that the union's duty extends beyond actual union members -- the collective bargaining agreement itself speaks of "unit members" as those regularly employed by the district (see also, Civil Service Law ? 203) -- and that Smith v Sipe (67 N.Y.2d 928,supra) did not address the status issue that now confronts us. While the dissent of Presiding Justice Mahoney, adopted by this court, indeed speaks of a union's duty to fairly represent its "members" (109 A.D.2d 1034, 1036), the issue in that case was whether mere acts of negligence might constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation; the person to whom such a duty runs was not considered.

An employer cannot extinguish an employee's rights under a collective bargaining agreement by simply terminating the employment; nor would a wrongful discharge -- which is premised on a breach of agreement occurring during employment, while the individual was a member of the bargaining unit -- automatically sever the union's duty of fair representation arising from its role as exclusive bargaining agent. A cause of action can be and commonly is, brought after termination, premised on breach of the collective bargaining agreement or breach of the duty of fair representation during employment. (See, e.g., DelCostello v Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, supra; Vaca v Sipes, 386 U.S. 171; Gosper v Fancher, 49 A.D.2d 674, affd 40 N.Y.2d 867, cert denied 430 U.S. 915; Ferri v Public Employees Fedn., 92 A.D.2d 1054; Jackson v Regional Tr. Serv., 54 A.D.2d 305.) The fact that employment has terminated, in such instances, cannot absolve the labor organization of its responsibilities under the collective bargaining agreement and the law.

While plaintiff indeed filed her alleged grievance only after she had resigned, she was nonetheless a regular employee and thus a member of the bargaining unit at the time her grievance arose, and she has charged that breach of the collective bargaining agreement forced her resignation and amounted to a constructive discharge. Viewing plaintiff's assertions in her favor as we must on this dismissal motion, and without reaching the question whether there is any merit in plaintiff's claim, it appears that plaintiff's status is not materially different from that of an employee who claims he or she was actually fired in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. As in the case of a wrongful discharge, plaintiff's status as a former employee here does not divest her of the right to maintain an action for breach of the duty of fair representation during her employment.

The third ground of the dismissal motion -- that the action against the union must be dismissed because plaintiff failed to exhaust contractual and union remedies -- is fully answered by the record of plaintiff's efforts to present her claim in accordance with the three-stage grievance procedure provided in the collective bargaining agreement. In light of this record, the allegation of the complaint that she merely "attempted to" file a grievance cannot be regarded as a fatal deficiency (see, Credit Alliance Corp. v Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536,541, n 1; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 N.Y.2d 633).

Accordingly, the Appellate Division order should be reversed, with costs, and the motion of defendant West Irondequoit Teachers Association to dismiss the complaint as against it denied.

Disposition

Order reversed, etc.

Opinion Footnotes

^*fn1 As the union points out in its brief, resolution of the issue as to the union could also determine the applicable limitations period as against the employer. Additionally, in light of our holding, we need not determine when plaintiff's cause of action accrued -- whether upon exhaustion of the grievance procedures or upon the union's first notification that it would proceed no further on her behalf. If the Legislature were to fix the appropriate Statute of Limitations, it might further choose to settle the interrelated issue of accrual date (see, e.g., CPLR 217).

^*fn2 We therefore do not consider the contention first raised on this appeal that the union's rejection of plaintiff's grievance is at most a mere mistake in contract interpretation, which does not rise to the level of violation of the duty of fair representation (see, Smith v Sipe, 67 N.Y.2d 928).

Interest Arbitration or Settle

2011-01-28T09:57:00.000-08:00

Some of you may have read in the Southampton Patch that Mayor Robert Mark Epley wants to settle the contract with the PBA as part of his New Years Resolutions. That said I thought you PBA members new to the PBA Union would like to now what an Interest Arbitration Award looks like. If you can get past all the gloom and doom, not to mention internal strife, then you will see the real benefits to seeking interest arbitration.

For me as the author to this blog and a first time reader to the award I can’t but notice a glaring reference. Some of you will remember a contentious PBA meeting that dealt with approving a PBA contract that had multiple raises for Detectives, Sergeant and Lieutenants but leaving the Police Officers with smaller raises. You may also recall that during the roll call vote I was the only Sergeant that supported the rank and file police officers in their opposition to the lopsided contract that favored the gold shields. Now I ask that you take a close look at this arbitration award and see the reference and denial of extra raises for Detectives, Sergeant and Lieutenants.

http://www.perb.state.ny.us/pdf/ia1999-0/ia98-029.pdf

It would seem that the “haves” in the PBA always want more and the “have not(s)” must settle for table scraps.

JURY TRIAL DATE SET January 18th 2011

2010-12-09T16:37:00.000-08:00

Loyal Readers,

The Jury trial for my reverse discrimination complaint (Detective Lamison getting 2 promotions in the same week) was set in concrete for November 1st 2010. That concrete did not set up properly and Chief Wilson asked for a 2 week extension to November 15th 2010. On November 14th the Judge rescheduled the the Jury Trial for January 18th 2011.

Motion to Limine ( Latin "at the threshold" )

Take a few minutes and look at the evidence the Village of Southampton does not want you to hear, see or read about. This Motion before the court was filed to exclude certain evidence and testimony.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----------------------------------------------------------------X

CHRISTOPHER BROICH,

Index No.: 08-CV-553

Plaintiff,

- against -

THE INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF DEFENDANTSÕ

SOUTHAMPTON, THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES MOTIONS IN LIMINE

OF THE INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF

SOUTHAMPTON, MARK EPLEY, Individually and (Feuerstein, J)

as Mayor of the Incorporated Village of Southampton, (Lindsay, MJ)

BONNIE M. CANNON, Individually and as Trustee of

The Incorporated Village of Southampton, NANCY C.

MCGANN, Individually and as Trustee of the

Incorporated Village of Southampton, PAUL L.

ROBINSON, Individually and as Trustee of The

Incorporated Village of Southampton, LARS KING,

Individually and as Former Chief of Police of The

Incorporated Village of Southampton, and William

WILSON JR., Individually and as Chief of Police of

The Incorporated Village of Southampton,

Defendants.

-----------------------------------------------------------------X

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Mr. Broich, by second amended complaint alleges violations of 42 U.S.C.¤¤1981, 1983, 1985, Title VII and the New York State Executive Law, Civil Service Laws, and the New York Constitution against the Village of Southampton, the Board of Trustees, the individual trustees, Mayor Mark Epley and the former police chief, Lars King and current chief, William Wilson. By decision dated July 23, 2009 (Document No. 30), this Court dismissed plaintiffÕs section 1985 claims and claims against the Village Board trustees.

Defendants submitted a summary judgment motion, fully briefed by both parties on November 3, 2010. Notwithstanding the pendency of the summary judgment motion, defendants submit this motion at this juncture to provide plaintiff with sufficient time to respond.

Case 2:08-cv-00553-SJF-ARL Document 69 Filed 11/04/10 Page 1 of 7

Additionally, disciplinary findings against Mr. Broich were upheld by the Appellate Division, Second Department. Many of plaintiffÕs documents appear to be on his pre-trial order list to challenge these findings which he is collaterally estopped from doing

Plaintiff lists 104 exhibits on the joint pre-trial order. The first 9 exhibits consist of audio and/or video tape recordings. Defendants object to the introduction of the taped recordings.

CD/DVI 1 (PlaintiffÕs 1): This is a surreptitiously taped conversation between Mr. Broich and the PBA president, David Dorchak. Broich, knowing that he was taping, questioned the PBAÕs impartiality and discussed every grievance and complaint that he had regarding the Village. At some point, Broich educated Dorchak regarding Federal employment law and union law. It should be noted that David Dorchak asked Broich if he was being recorded and Broich responded that he was not being recorded. Broich concluded the lengthy conversation by reading to Dorchak the definition of police corruption.

Defendants oppose the introduction of this videotape based upon Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403 and 801.

Initially, it must be pointed out that the recording does not comport with the factors set forth in U.S. v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 121, in that the conversation elicited was not voluntarily made without any kind of inducement. In this case, plaintiff expounds upon his perceived views of the police department and village in an attempt to bolster his case, after having lied to the other conversant advising that the conversation was not being recorded.

The conversation contained in this DVD is not relevant to this case. There is nothing that David Dorchak says during this conversation that would tend to prove or disprove the existence of any material fact. Mr. Dorchak was at Mr. BroichÕs residence in his capacity as PBA president and was not there as a representative of the police department.

Case 2:08-cv-00553-SJF-ARL Document 69 Filed 11/04/10 Page 2 of 7

In the event that this Court should find that this tape is somehow relevant, then it should be excluded pursuant to Rule 403. Any limited probative value is substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice to defendants, needless presentation of cumulative evidence, and undue delay.

CD/DVD 2 (PlaintiffÕs 2): This video tape is purported to show the trustee and mayor candidatesÕ debate sponsored by the League of Women Voters which occurred on June 4, 2005. Plaintiff supplied a copy which does not accurately reflect the debate. The recording has noticeable skips and gaps. CandidatesÕ presentations are cut-off in midsentence. We advised plaintiffÕs counsel of the defect and returned the DVD, only to be advised that there was no defect. PlaintiffÕs counsel sent the original copy and a copy thereof, both of which have gaps. Either the recording device was not functioning or the person doing the recording was editing as the debate was occurring. Defendants therefore object due to incompleteness to the extent that the presentations are incomprehensible.

Defendants further object to the tapes pursuant to Rules 401 and 403 of the Rules of Evidence. The dialogue between political candidates in an effort to become elected in no way tends to make the existence of a material fact in this case more or less probable. Lastly, the value of the tape is outweighed by considerations of undue delay, waste of time and needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

CD/DVD 3 (PlaintiffÕs 3): This is an audio recording of a conversation that Mr. Broich is having with two people, one of whom attended the police academy with Kim McMahon, a person Broich accuses Chief Wilson of having an extramarital affair with. In this conversation, Mr. Broich states that he wanted a female perspective on Kim McMahon (the alleged paramour). Much of the conversation consists of gossip regarding the police department. The female

Case 2:08-cv-00553-SJF-ARL Document 69 Filed 11/04/10 Page 3 of 7

discusses numerous anecdotes regarding Chief WilsonÕs alleged affair with McMahon.

Defendants object to this taped recording being allowed into evidence. It is inconceivable that this tape is in any way relevant to any material issues in this case. This is nothing more than an attempt to attack Chief WilsonÕs character and reputation. Pursuant to Rule 401, it should not be admitted into evidence.

CD/DVD 4 (PlaintiffÕs 4): This DVD should not be admitted for the same reasons as DVD 3. This is a recording of Kim McMahonÕs sister discussing Kim McMahon and her relationships with various people, including allegedly, Chief Wilson.

PlaintiffÕs objective can be nothing more than to harass the chief by submitting untrustworthy, baseless, non-relevant and highly prejudicial recordings to the jury.

Pursuant to Rules 401, 403, 404 and 802, both CD/DVD 3 and 4 should not be allowed into evidence.

CD/DVD 5 (PlaintiffÕs 5): Plaintiff, in furtherance of his plan of character assassination seeks to introduce a taped conversation between a police officer and Broich, wherein the police officer claims that he was hired by the chief to install a satellite dish in his vehicle and the chief refused to pay him due to the dish not working. The officer claims he did this work during work hours. The officer advises Broich about debts to other persons not paid by the chief. Throughout this conversation, the police officer repeatedly tells Broich that the conversation is confidential, just between him and Broich.

This tape must also be excluded pursuant to Rules 401, 403, 404 and 802 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. It is not relevant, prejudicial and pure character assassination by hearsay.

CD/DVD 6 (PlaintiffÕs 6): This disc contains a copy of plaintiffÕs Article 78 proceeding to annul his termination decision. While defendants would ask this Court to take judicial notice

Case 2:08-cv-00553-SJF-ARL Document 69 Filed 11/04/10 Page 4 of 7

of the fact that the plaintiff instituted an Article 78 proceeding against the Village and that the Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed that determination, defendants oppose the submission of the underlying petition and responsive papers.

Pursuant to Rule 403 this evidence should be excluded due to its minimal probative value. These documents constitute nothing more than bolstering and will create a confusion of issues to the jury.

CD/DVD 7 (PlaintiffÕs 7): This is a taped phone message left on plaintiffÕs phone by Captain Cummings. In this message Cummings asks Broich if he could Òhelp him outÓ with a ticket Broich wrote to a friend. Cummings asks Broich to call him back.

Defendants request that this be excluded since it is not relevant to any material issues in this case. Pursuant to Rules 401 and 403, we request that this tape be excluded.

CD/DVD 8 (PlaintiffÕs 8): This is a video recording of the candidatesÕ debate in 2007. Defendants object due to relevancy and Rule 403. Defendants object to the submission of this tape based upon Rules 401 and 403 of the Rules of Evidence. The probative value of the tape is outweighed by prejudice to the defendant, and considerations of undue delay and waste of time.

CD/DVD 9 (PlaintiffÕs 9): Purports to be a recording of a village board meeting on February 11, 2005. Defendants object to the introduction of this recording because a copy of same has never been provided. Defendants returned the discs to plaintiffÕs counsel advising that the contents on the disc were defective. This recording also contains multiple gaps.

PlaintiffÕs 10, 11, 13, 14, 15: These documents consist of plaintiffÕs charges filed with the EEOC. Defendants object to the submission of these documents pursuant to Rule 403. The documents are cumulative and contain hearsay. Submission of these charges constitutes bolstering on plaintiffÕs part. Many of the factual allegations are not relevant to this case and

Case 2:08-cv-00553-SJF-ARL Document 69 Filed 11/04/10 Page 5 of 7

plaintiff will be able to testify regarding the relevant allegations.

PlaintiffÕs 39, 40, 41, 42, 43: These are newspaper articles from local newspapers concerning various village police department issues.

Defendants request that these articles be excluded as untrustworthy, non-relevant and prejudicial. The articles are titled: ÒComplaint challenges bias claim, makes new allegationsÓ (Southampton Press, 1/19/06); ÒDiscord is a fact of life for cops in villageÓ (Southampton Press, 1/26/06); ÒState probes village cops over ticketsÓ (Southampton Press); ÒChief calls halt to security firm, Detective wonÕt face criminal chargeÓ; and ÒFired Police Officer files $5M lawsuit.Ó

The articles are hearsay and not trustworthy and therefore not admissible. McAllister v. New York City Police Department, 49 F.Supp.2d 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Delrosario v. City of N.Y., 210 W.L. 882990. See also: Griffin v. City of New York, 287 F.Supp.2d. 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). These articles must be excluded pursuant to Rules 401, 403 and 801.

Testimony and Documents regarding Chief Wilson

In addition to the exclusion of the recordings regarding Chief WilsonÕs alleged affair (PlaintiffÕs 3 and 4) and Chief WilsonÕs hiring and failure to pay a police officer (PlaintiffÕs 5), it is respectfully requested that this Court direct that neither plaintiff, nor his witnesses, testify regarding non-relevant alleged bad acts by Chief Wilson. Specifically, plaintiff should not be able to testify about:

1. The ChiefÕs alleged affair;

2. The ChiefÕs efforts to amend Mr. CassabiancaÕs Suffolk Pistol Permit and BroichÕs complaint to the Department of Licensing. Chief Wilson and plaintiff once operated a security company together. Mr. Broich now claims improprieties regarding the licensing of

Case 2:08-cv-00553-SJF-ARL Document 69 Filed 11/04/10 Page 6 of 7

WilsonÕs security company. PlaintiffÕs documents numbered 53-56 and 58-60 concern plaintiffÕs complaint to the licensing board and the proceeding. Chief Wilson withdrew from the security company and his wife took control. Most of the documents concern Chief WilsonÕs wife.

Defendants request the opportunity to submit a supplemental motion, if necessary, upon receipt of this CourtÕs decision regarding their partial summary judgment motion.

Dated: Smithtown, New York

November 4, 2010

Respectfully submitted,

By: _____/S/________________________

JELTJE DE JONG (JD/4452)

DEVITT SPELLMAN BARRETT LLP

Attorneys for Defendants,

50 Route 111

Smithtown, New York 11787

TO: Steven A. Morelli, Esq.

(Via ECF)

Case 2:08-cv-00553-SJF-ARL Document 69 Filed 11/04/10 Page 7 of 7

Demand Financial Disclosures from your Public Officials in Foreclosure - 3.7 Million owed

2010-10-06T14:40:00.000-07:00

Owner: Herman Lamison Jr. - Southampton Village Police

32 Mill Farm Lane, Southampton NY 11968

Land Purchased in 2001 with $60,000.00 interest free loan

from Mayor Epley's father-in-law George Benedict to

be paid upon sale of property. Modular House built

same year for $180,000.00.

Index No. 2010-02914 Schedule "C" Amount Owed $2,465,365.53

Foreclosure Suffolk County Supreme Court

http://www.scribd.com/doc/38848326/Lamison-32MillFarm

http://www.scribd.com/doc/38848281/Lamison-32MillFarm-B

http://www.scribd.com/doc/38849327/Lamison-32-Mill-Farm-A

Owner: Herman Lamison Jr. - Southampton Village Police

106 Powell Ave., Southampton NY 11968

Purchased in 2002 for $135,000.00

Index No. 2010-02915 Schedule "C" Amount Owed $703,571.58

Foreclosure Suffolk County Supreme Court

http://www.scribd.com/doc/38848463/Lamison-106-Powell

http://www.scribd.com/doc/38848390/Lamison-106-Powell-A

Owner: Herman Lamison Jr. - Southampton Village Police

166 Powell Ave., Southampton New York

December 16th 2003 Purchased for $350,000.00

8/31/2010 Summons with Notice - Foreclosure Index No. 2010-32396

Schedule "C" amount owed $614,813.42

http://www.scribd.com/doc/38851672/Lamison-166-Powell-A

Retirement Pay in the Inc Village of Southampton-NY Newsday

2010-10-01T19:26:00.000-07:00

1	Sherry, James J	Village Of Southampton	2005-06-01	$96,549.36
2	Nordt, Fredrick E	Village Of Southampton	2009-11-25	$71,338.20
3	Romeo, Robert A	Village Of Southampton	2008-04-30	$67,134.00
4	King, Lars E	Village Of Southampton	2006-09-30	$61,782.12
5	Betts, David A	Village Of Southampton	2001-03-15	$58,396.32
6	Mc Keefrey, John G	Village Of Southampton	2009-07-19	$58,277.64
7	Platt, Brian B	Village Of Southampton	2008-09-24	$53,148.72
8	Burrell, Alison M	Village Of Southampton	2008-07-30	$51,925.20
9	Donovan, Marla B	Village Of Southampton	2006-11-19	$51,261.48
10	Dombrowski, Eugene	Village Of Southampton	2005-05-01	$46,807.80
11	Yastrzemski, Chester A	Village Of Southampton	1987-11-21	$42,737.40
12	Schucht, Michael J	Village Of Southampton	2001-05-01	$42,400.80
13	Olender, Anthony J	Village Of Southampton	1995-07-01	$41,994.00
14	Orlando, Peter F	Village Of Southampton	1996-06-15	$39,827.88
15	Brown, Robert W	Village Of Southampton	1996-09-27	$37,194.12
16	Esposito, Ralph A	Village Of Southampton	1995-04-19	$36,484.32
17	Russell, Paul M	Village Of Southampton	1987-06-16	$35,722.56
18	Lawrence, Robert G	Village Of Southampton	2002-10-03	$34,124.28
19	Kimensky, Dedra A	Village Of Southampton	2007-06-30	$31,622.04
20	Micallef, Betty A	Village Of Southampton	2002-11-29	$29,897.76
21	Distler, Russell E	Village Of Southampton	1988-03-01	$29,378.52
22	Tucker, George J, Jr	Village Of Southampton	1998-12-31	$27,825.24
23	Jones, Bruce C	Village Of Southampton	1995-08-12	$26,467.68
24	Croghan, Paul D	Village Of Southampton	2004-04-30	$25,382.64
25	Guldi, Miriam A	Village Of Southampton	2001-05-04	$25,064.28
26	Volkmer, Fred C	Village Of Southampton	2007-07-24	$23,667.36
27	Davis, Daniel, Jr	Village Of Southampton	2007-03-18	$22,688.52
28	Dimonda, Paula	Village Of Southampton	2008-12-05	$22,333.32
29	Kraszewski, John P	Village Of Southampton	1971-04-30	$21,939.24
30	Hogan, Michael F	Village Of Southampton	1973-05-29	$19,710.00
31	Johnson, Clifford J	Village Of Southampton	2002-12-29	$19,385.88
32	Van Nostrand, James A	Village Of Southampton	2009-11-28	$18,563.88
33	Porter, Carol Ann	Village Of Southampton	2005-10-01	$17,536.92
34	Romano, Eugene R	Village Of Southampton	1988-07-06	$16,735.32
35	Depetris, Emil F	Village Of Southampton	1985-07-01	$16,544.64
36	Cole, Joyce R	Village Of Southampton	1993-11-12	$14,235.72
37	Fanning, Donald E	Village Of Southampton	1986-07-18	$13,676.64
38	Finnegan, Mildred E	Village Of Southampton	1991-12-28	$13,093.80
39	Brockmann, Erich	Village Of Southampton	2008-09-30	$12,201.60
40	Crawley, Collier	Village Of Southampton	1990-09-02	$12,110.04
41	Gilmartin, David J	Village Of Southampton	2002-01-02	$12,051.00
42	Mc Coy, William F	Village Of Southampton	1996-09-27	$8,977.44
43	Kemp, Gerald J	Village Of Southampton	1994-03-19	$8,199.24
44	Lokaj, Charles	Village Of Southampton	1991-06-27	$8,089.44
45	Maltese, Samuel L	Village Of Southampton	2007-02-16	$7,978.92
46	Weiss, Lynne M	Village Of Southampton	2004-05-28	$7,794.96
47	Parash, Beatrice	Village Of Southampton	1996-12-23	$5,954.04
48	Bogen, Herbert	Village Of Southampton	1986-09-03	$5,879.64
49	Adamchak, Veronica Mary	Village Of Southampton	1997-06-01	$5,423.28
50	Rigo, Martha	Village Of Southampton	1981-09-01	$3,119.40
51	Tucker, Richard E	Village Of Southampton	1996-05-01	$2,580.84
52	Romanosky, Joseph P, Jr	Village Of Southampton	2005-07-01	$1,047.84

The Ticket Fixing Voice Mail

2010-09-13T08:57:00.000-07:00

Everybody in government seems to know about the "ticket-fixing" audio recording but nobody has heard it. Listen for yourself. I didn't record Captain Cummings he recorded himself.

"Click Here to Hear"

Southampton Press May 21st 1998

2010-08-26T15:41:00.000-07:00

Southampton Press
Issue Date: 05/21/98 May 1998

Only 1 Full-Time Detective Left for the Village Police

By Colin Grey

Southampton Village Police is down to one full-time detective.

With one of its detectives on sick leave and two others recently demoted by the Village Board, Detective Fred Nordt has been the department's lone investigator for the past three weeks. While the police chief and mayor say it is no cause for alarm, Det. Nordt this week blasted the brass for jeopardizing public safety.

"Basically what management is doing is they're taking a pair of dice, they're rolling them on the table and they're hoping they don't crap out," said Det. Nordt, who is also president of the village Police Benevolent Association (PBA).

As of Friday, May 15, the detective division had three cases pending, including a $250,000 burglary that occurred at a Halsey Neck Lane home on April 27. Det. Nordt can handle it all with a little help, according to Chief James Sherry.

But more cases could come in at any moment, Det. Nordt said.

"I don't know if psychic powers come with rank, but how do you predict the future?" he said.

The Southampton Village Board voted 3-2 to remove Detective Herman Lamison and Detective George Ronan from the rank of detective and place them back on patrol on April 23. Then, about one week later, Detective Sergeant Michael Schuct went on sick leave due to stress.

The board moved Det. Lamison and Det. Ronan to patrol at Chief Sherry's recommendation because the number of cases being handled by village detectives had dropped dramatically in recent years and because the department had not been able to find enough seasonal officers for the summer.

Following the logic of law enforcement that has brought down crime rates across the country, Chief Sherry said that the Village Police Department was emphasizing law enforcement at the "front line"—with patrol officers—rather than the follow-up investigations done by detectives.

Chief Sherry stood by his recommendation in an interview this week. When the village formed a detective's division in 1981, the detectives handled about 100 cases a year. Recently, that number has dropped to about 45 cases a year per detective, he said.

"In the future, if the dynamics change and our crime rate increases and the need arises, we'll go back and revisit that area and do what we have to do to be effective," Chief Sherry said.

For the moment, the village has enlisted the aid of an investigator from the Suffolk County District Attorney's office to help with the Halsey Neck Lane burglary. Meanwhile, Detectives Lamison and Ronan remain on patrol.

Both detectives had their base salary cut to $61,033 from $64,085, although other incentives offset the loss, according to Chief Sherry.

Det. Nordt dismissed Chief Sherry's arguments, saying that even if the detective's division did not have many pending cases, it still had about 140 pending warrants.

"That's a bunch of baloney," he said of the chief's nationale. "It's like punishing the men because they did a good job."

Mayor Douglas Murtha this week reaffirmed the board's decision. "It would be irresponsible not to make that adjustment," he said.

Other board members were not convinced. Trustee Harald Steudte, who voted against lowering the ranks of Detectives Lamison and Ronan, said the move was not necessary. "You didn't have to do this," he said.

Mr. Steudte said he also objected because Detective Lamison, as the only black member of the force, set a good example for local children. "I think he's a role model, and I think that has some value," he said.

Trustee Gil Tennant was the other board member to vote against the demotions. Mayor Murtha, Trustee William Manger and Trustee Jacob Buchheit voted in favor of the demotion. At the same meeting, they voted 3-2 to promote Officer Christopher Broich to sergeant.

Southampton Press April 23rd 1998

2010-08-26T15:36:00.000-07:00

Southampton Press
Issue Date: 04/23/98 April 1998

2 Detectives Laid Off

By Elizabeth Collins

Two Southampton Village Police detectives—half of the force—will be reassigned effective April 24 after a decision by the Southampton Village Board following an executive session late Tuesday night.

Police Chief James Sherry said that the two detectives with the least seniority, George Ronan and Herman Lamison, will be laid off. Both men will be restored to the rank of police officer and they will serve in the patrol division.

Chief Sherry said he was forced to lay off the detectives because he needed to fill two vacancies in his staff of police officers. One officer died this year and one was dismissed after an unsatisfactory probationary period, said Chief Sherry. He has been unable to find qualified part-time police officers to work for the summer, and he said he needed Detectives Ronan and Lamison to fill in the gap.

"Policing is always in flux," said Chief Sherry yesterday. "It's possible that we may revisit this issue after the summer and reverse it at that time."

The Southampton Village Board also announced on Tuesday night their resolution to promote one police officer, Christopher Broich, to the rank of sergeant.